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Abstract
Parents preferring sons tend to go on to have more children until a boy is born, and to concentrate
investment in boys for a given number of children (sibsize). Thus, having a brother may affect child
education in two ways: an indirect effect by keeping sibsize lower and a direct rivalry effect where sibsize
remains constant. We estimate the direct and indirect effects of a next brother on the first child’s
education conditional on potential sibsize. We address endogenous sibsize using twins. We find new
evidence of sibling rivalry and gender bias that cannot be detected by conventional methods.
1 Introduction
Gender bias in families has been persisting across generations in many regions. Girls in India, for example,
get weaned earlier, receive less childcare and healthcare, and suffer from higher mortality.1 However, some
studies find no evidence that Indian females receive less care than males under normal circumstances (e.g.
Duflo, 2005). Deaton (1997, 2003) suggests that equal parental spending and vaccination were carried out
for both genders in the same regions. Using data from Taiwan — a society with a long tradition of preferring
sons over daughters2 — we also find surprising evidence of females having the advantage in completing high
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school or attaining university education.3
One explanation for these mixed results is that females are more enduring than males given the same care
(Waldron, 1983); consequently, gender differences in child outcomes often understate the degree of gender
bias. Alternatively, the endowment deficit of males can be canceled out by comparing the sibling gender
effect on male versus female outcomes, while keeping the realized number of siblings (sibsize) constant. This
strategy has been adopted by the literature on sibling rivalry (or cross-sibling competition).4 However, the
method of keeping the realized sibsize constant does not work for households that would go on to have more
children until they get a son — the so-called son-preferring stopping rule of childbearing (Yamaguchi, 1989;
Jensen, 2005; Filmer, Friedman and Schady, 2009). Since households following the son-preferring stopping
rule are excluded from estimation, previously estimated effects of gender composition of siblings might have
understated the degree of gender bias.
Son preference and the son-preferring stopping rule suggest that having a brother may affect the human
capital formation of a boy or a girl in two ways: an indirect effect (IE) by decreasing potential sibsize
and a direct effect (DE) where potential sibsize remains constant. Under son preference, DE captures the
rivalry effect of a son (relative to a daughter) on child outcomes, keeping other things (including potential
sibsize) constant. Under the son-preferring stopping rule, IE captures the gain/penalty from the reduced
sibsize by the presence of a brother, keeping other things (including potential sibling gender) constant. If
child quality is independent of quantity, then IE is zero. However, if child quality decreases with quantity,
then IE is positive. Because DE and IE may go in opposite directions, the overall impact of a brother on
child outcomes can appear to be too small, particularly in countries with strong pro-son bias.5 Therefore,
understanding the relative importance of DE and IE is necessary in detecting gender discrimination.
Given that the gender composition of the existing children affects fertility choice, the conventional meth-
ods of “keeping the realized sibsize constant” creates bad-control problems, which not only understate DE
but also leave IE undefined (because no variation in sibsize is left for defining IE, after the realized sibsize
has been fixed). Since IE has not been formulated in the existing literature on gender bias, the relative
magnitude of IE to DE is still an open question.
Rather than keeping the realized sibsize constant, new methods have been proposed recently to address
the bad-control problem. The most notable work comes from Barcellos, Carvalho and Lleras-Muney (2014),
who shut down the IE channel by restricting their sample to infants under 15 months of age. This strategy
3Rudd (1993) finds no evidence of discrimination against females in the expenditure data of Taiwan during the early 1990s.
4See Parish and Willis (1993), Butcher and Case (1994), Kaestner (1997), Garg and Morduch (1998), Morduch (2000),
Steelman, Powell, Werum and Carter (2002) and Lafortune and Lee (2014).
5Vogl (2013) estimates the overall impact of a next sister on older sisters’ marriage and parental co-residence, using data
from South Asia where the son-preferring stopping rule is prevalent. Having a next sister not only increases family size but also
increases the firstborn girl’s marriage risk. Both DE and IE of a next sister on firstborn outcomes in this context are likely
negative.
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works because mothers are unable to respond to a firstborn infant’s gender by having more babies in such
a short window. They find strong evidence of gender imbalance in receiving childcare, which is not masked
by the son-preferring fertility-stopping rule.
Our objective is to provide causal estimates of DE and IE of a next brother on the education of firstborn
females/males.6 We focus on the sibling gender effects on the firstborn, not on children born later, because
the presence of any later-born child is endogenous, depending on the gender composition of existing siblings.
Under the son-preferring stopping rule, a firstborn son reduces completed family size. Consequently, a
comparison of the outcomes of younger sisters with a firstborn brother versus a firstborn sister captures the
differences in parental demand for sons and desire for a large family, in addition to the effect of firstborn
gender; thus, it is difficult to interpret causally.7 We address this issue by focusing on firstborn outcomes.
This study confronts four important challenges. The first is to formulate DE and IE that are valid
regardless of whether households follow the son-preferring stopping rule or not. Rather than using the
realized sibsize to define DE and IE, we use potential sibsize because in counterfactual worlds it is possible
to fix/change potential sibsize with a change in sibling gender composition. We decompose the overall impact
of sibling gender on human capital accumulation into two separate causal channels: the active reallocation
of parental resources along the direction of gender given potential sibsize (i.e. DE) and the passive effect of
sibling gender through changing potential sibsize upon a change in sibling gender composition (i.e. IE).8 We
show that the coefficient of sibling gender in a human capital formation model cannot be interpreted causally,
even if consistently estimated, but it is useful in constructing the decomposed effects of sibling gender. Given
strong preference for sons, we find evidence that the degree of quality-quantity tradeoffs may vary with sibling
gender composition. Thus, an interaction term between sibsize and sibling gender composition is required
for unbiased estimation of human capital formation in the presence of gender bias. We show that omission of
the interaction term is equivalent to exclusion of the son-preferring fertility-stopping rule, which is strongly
rejected by our data.
The second challenge is to address the endogeneity of family size. While a large empirical literature has
taken the endogeneity of family size seriously with respect to various outcomes (including child education),9
this is less of a recognized issue in studies on the effect of gender composition of siblings. Given that the
6Our method is a simple modification of a broad literature on quality-quantity tradeoffs (e.g. Black, Devereux and Salvanes,
2005, 2010; Angrist, Lavy and Schlosser, 2010).
7The literature on the rivalry effect of male siblings investigates the effect of sex ratios of older siblings (or the total number
of sisters/brothers) on child outcomes. Important examples include Parish and Willis (1993), Butcher and Case (1994) and Garg
and Morduch (1998). We compare our method with these three studies by using our data and running the same regressions as
theirs. We find various results across models (Table A8), and the estimates vary after conditioning on birth order (Table A9).
8Oaxaca’s decomposition cannot work when the grouping variable (that is, sibsize in this paper) is a mediating variable
which affects outcomes (child education) and is affected by the treatment variable (sibling gender composition).
9See Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005, 2010), Li, Zhang and Zhu (2008), Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) and Angrist,
Lavy and Schlosser (2010).
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sibling gender effect works in part through its effect on family size, it is important to treat endogenous family
size properly. Simply controlling for the realized sibsize in regressions of child outcomes on sibling gender
can yield misleading results. Following the previous literature on family size effects on child outcomes, we
address the endogeneity issue by exploiting the plausibly exogenous variation in sibsize due to twinning at
the second birth, conditional on family background characteristics. Critiques of the twins instrument have
noted that the tradeoff between child quality and quantity is understated (or overstated) if parents who have
secondborn twins invest more (or less) in the first child than those who have a secondborn singleton, due to
an endowment reinforcing (or compensating) motive. Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) recommend a remedy for
this problem by including the initial health conditions of the secondborn children. Because fetal conditions
may reflect adult risk of disease or lifestyle, relating to unobserved factors of child outcomes, we prefer not
to include child initial conditions in regressions. Nevertheless, we discuss the results from Rosenzweig and
Zhang’s approach as robustness checks.
The third challenge is to address potential concerns about endogenous child gender, due to potential
sex-selective abortion or recall errors. We minimize this possibility by restricting the birth registry data to
firstborn children who were born prior to 1985 when abortion was not legal and sex testing technology was
not widely available. Using the same data as ours, Lin, Liu and Qian (2014) have noted that the sex ratio
at birth for the first two parities remained within the normal range between 1980 and 1992. The sex ratio
started diverging from this after 1986 but only for the third- and higher-parity births. Consistent with their
findings, our test statistics show that endogeneity of child gender for the first two births is not a concern in
our data.
The fourth challenge is to overcome data limitations. Typically, child outcomes could not be observed
directly after infancy, and family size and sibling gender composition could only be observed partially or
indirectly.10 Using Birth Registry data for all of Taiwan since 1978, we ensure that data on family size and
sibling gender composition are complete and accurate, by tracing at least 15 years of fertility history for each
mother who first gave birth prior to 1985. By matching Birth Registry records with University Entrance
Test records, we can observe each firstborn child’s educational outcomes during adolescence, in addition to
complete family size and sibling gender composition.
The empirical results of our modified approach indicate that both DE and IE are near zero for firstborn
males. In contrast, firstborn females have a negative direct effect and a positive indirect effect, which
almost cancel each other out, the result being a near-zero total effect. This finding offers new evidence of
gender bias in family settings, evidence that cannot be detected by conventional methods. Conventional
10One exception is the data from Norway in Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005, 2010), but decomposed effects of sibling
gender composition are not their focus.
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measures such as gender gaps have suggested unambiguous female advantages of completing high school and
entering university. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates also suggest much smaller DE and IE than
those constructed from our instrumental variables (IV) estimates.
This study represents the first attempt to formulate and estimate the indirect effect of sibling gender on
child outcomes via a change in potential family size. The result pointing to a large and positive indirect
effect has important implications for policy. If parents’ ability to control their total fertility is restricted (as
in the case of the one-child policy in China), the overall impact of sibling gender could be much greater.
Although we study a particular economy where son preference is strong, it is exactly in countries where son
preference is strongest that we may expect the coexistence of DE and IE, driven respectively by gender
discrimination among siblings and son-preferring stopping rules.
As a byproduct of our analysis, we find the effects of family size on child education, as well as the
direction of omitted variable bias, highly depend on the gender composition of children. OLS overstates
family size effects if the next sibling is male and understates them if it is female. This contrast is particularly
clear among firstborn females. If the next sibling is also female, parents’ utility gain from a larger family is
greater. If the next sibling is a brother, the son-preferring stopping rule kicks in and parents’ utility gain
from a larger family is smaller. The two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates suggest that a third child in
the family would lower firstborn daughters’ high school completion rate or university enrollment rate by
about one-third if the next sibling is female too. The effect of family size on firstborn males’ education is
also reduced by a next brother, although the estimates are imprecise and much smaller in magnitude than
the effect on firstborn daughters’.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our data sets, reports evidence
of strong preference for multiple sons and presents descriptive analysis on the relationship between family
composition and child education. Section 3 clarifies the definitions of direct and indirect effects and de-
scribes our empirical strategies to identify them. Section 4 summarizes the empirical findings, discusses the
exogeneity of child gender and the twins instrument, and examines the robustness of our main results. We
explore various interpretations for the patterns of effect heterogeneity. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Descriptive Analysis
Identifying the impact of a change in sibling gender composition on educational achievement requires a
large amount of detailed data. The data should contain information about sibling gender composition of
completed families and child educational attainment up to the late teens. To fulfill this requirement, we link
two Taiwanese national administrative data sets — Birth Registry and University Entrance Test records.
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Our master data file is the Birth Registry of Taiwan since 1978 (the initial year of the digitization of
the data). It contains information on each newborn child’s birthweight, birth order, birthplace (by district),
parents’ education levels and everyone’s exact birth date. The data also contain everyone’s identifier, which
allows us to link all children to mothers. We restrict our data to 965,330 mothers whose first child was
born when the mother was 18 or older, prior to 4 January 1985 when the Eugenics Protection Law (which
lists the cases where pregnant women could legally abort a fetus and thus opens the door to some doctors
assisting the abortion of unwanted female fetuses) began to be enforced.11 Although prenatal sex testing
by ultrasound was introduced in Taiwan during the early 1980s, it was only after 1986 that the technology
for sex testing became widely available. Lin, Liu and Qian (2014) show that Taiwanese sex ratios at birth
start being unbalanced after 1986, and the unbalanced trends are limited to singletons of third- and higher
birth orders. As further discussed in Section 2.2, we show that sex-selective abortion is not a concern in our
pre-1985 firstborn data.
Birth Registry has detailed categorical information about parental education. Because the years of
education on academic versus vocational tracks are not comparable, we capture the variation in parental
education using five indicators: university degree or higher, professional training degree, high school diploma,
vocational high school diploma and junior high school diploma. The excluded category — primary school
or lower — is the reference group.
To measure the sibling gender composition of completed families, we trace all births of the 965,330
mothers for 15 to 22 years after their first birth, until 1999. No mother in our data had a child in either 1998
or 1999, so the measures of completed family size and sibling gender composition can be considered accurate.
Taiwan has no forceful birth-control policy (such as China’s one-child policy) promulgated, so son-preferring
parents have no incentive to under-report a female birth, as Hull (1990) has raised as a concern for the case
of China. Rather, they will keep having children until a boy is born. Thus, our data are not distorted by
under-reported female births.
Table 1 summarizes the distribution of the 965,330 families by number of children. To causally link child
education to sibling gender composition (depending on the birth order), we focus on the education of 851,044
firstborn singletons from families with two or more children (which account for 88% of all families). For
families with two or more children, the sex ratio of boys to girls for the firstborn is 1.04, but it drops rapidly
with the number of children. The sex ratio goes from 1.38 for families with two children to 0.94 or lower
for those with three or more children. For groupwise comparisons, we construct an urban indicator for the
five special municipalities (Taipei, New Taipei, Kaohsiung, Taichung and Tainan), which are home to 60%
11We limit our data to fathers no younger than 18. We exclude observations if the birthday of the second parity is missing,
or if the number of multiple births at the second parity exceeds three.
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of the total population and each of which has an assembly and budget of its own. In most specifications, we
include district fixed effects for firstborn birthplace, and the results show no difference with or without the
urban dummy.
2.1 Education and Characteristics of Firstborn Children
We acquired education data from the University Entrance Test records of 1996 to 2003 when the firstborn
just turned 18. The data include two sets of tests: general tests (conducted in February during the high
school senior year) and union entrance tests (conducted in July after high school graduation). These tests
offer two distinct channels for university education. Students can apply for university admission using their
general test scores and skip the tests in July. If their application results are unsatisfactory, students can
forgo early admissions and take the union entrance tests in July after graduation.
We construct an indicator for high school completion using “having taken general tests in February” as a
proxy because most graduating seniors take the tests. Typically, the brightest high school graduates attend
public universities. During our sample years from 1996 to 2003, tuition fees in public universities were about
14% of average yearly family income, whereas the cost of attending private university was about 25%.
Although we only observe test scores among admitted students, we observe each test-taker’s university
admission receipt. Combining this information with Birth Registry, we construct the university admission
indicator for each firstborn child being admitted to university at age 18. Our calculation of the rates of high
school completion and university attainment excludes vocational high schools and vocational colleges, and
uses the firstborn cohort size as denominator. As Table 1 summarizes, 24% of firstborns from families with
two or more children complete (academic) high school and 17% attain university education, which are the
same education levels of the overall firstborn population.
Our treatment group is firstborn children whose next sibling is a brother (Boy2nd = 1). In the control
group, the next sibling is a sister (Boy2nd = 0). If the second birth results in mixed-gender twins or triplets,
then we randomize sibling gender using the fraction of males from the birth — rather than assign the sex
ratio or the number of male siblings to Boy2nd — in order to maintain the exclusion restriction condition
for the twins instrument and to separate the effect of a next brother from the effect of family size. We set
Boy2nd to 1 with probability 0.5 for mixed-gender twins, probability 0.33 for triplets with one male and
probability 0.66 for triplets with two males; otherwise, we set it to 0. Overall, 214,846 firstborn females and
222,915 firstborn males are in the treatment group (who have a secondborn brother), while 201,469 firstborn
females and 211,814 firstborn males are in the control group (who have a secondborn sister). We discuss our
results from balancing checks in the next subsection.
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2.2 Balancing Tests
Our empirical strategy requires sibling gender composition at the first two births to be conditionally exoge-
nous. We first note that the sex ratio of boys to girls at birth is 1.044 for firstborns (Table 1) and 1.053–1.066
for their next siblings (Table 2). Both ratios are within the range (1.04–1.08) that demographers consider
normal on the basis of historical evidence (Chahnazarian, 1988; Johansson and Nygren, 1991). Since ul-
trasound (the technology for prenatal testing for child gender) was not available prior to 1980, we further
report in Table 2 whether or not the pre- and post-1980 firstborn populations are different. A mean differ-
ence test suggests the sex ratio at birth does not differ significantly across cohorts. In fact, the post-1980
cohort is less male-dominated than the pre-1980 cohort. Additionally, the fraction of firstborns who were
born in urban areas does not change across cohorts either. However, the mean difference tests show that the
post-1980 birth cohort has significantly older and more educated parents. This is because some parents in
our firstborn data experienced the expansion of compulsory education from six to nine years during the late
1960s. Compulsory education expansion might have postponed the timing of marriage and childbearing.
Although the presence of sex-selective abortion is neither observable nor testable in the data, we im-
plement balance tests between samples with a secondborn son versus daughter (Boy2nd = 1 versus 0) in
samples split by firstborn gender. In Columns (1) and (2) of Table A1, the unconditional mean differences in
demographics suggest that secondborn sons are positively associated with older mothers and more educated
parents, but this is limited to firstborn females. However, the unconditional mean differences in parental ed-
ucation might just reflect the maternal age effects induced by the son-preferring stopping rules; after having
a firstborn daughter, mothers tend to go on having children even at an old age. Indeed, when we include
parental education and year of birth and district fixed effects for firstborn birthplace in the regression of
Boy2nd, neither maternal age nor parental education can explain variation in the gender of the secondborn.
These results can be found in Columns (1) and (2) of Table A2.
Furthermore, we use the birth interval between the first two births to detect sex-selective abortion at the
second birth. After having a firstborn daughter, if a male birth is more likely to be selected by son-preferring
parents, the birth spacing could be distorted by the time it takes to abort a female fetus. Regressions of the
spacing between the first two births on sibling gender composition and family background factors suggest
no evidence of sex-selective abortion at the second birth. As Table 3 shows, the coefficient of the interaction
between Girl1st and Boy2nd is small (4.0 days) and statistically insignificant (SE=2.8 days), suggesting no
evidence of sex-selective abortion particularly at the second birth. This estimate is similar to the result when
we restrict our sample to firstborns for the pre- or post-1980 birth cohorts. Additionally, the coefficient of
Girl1st is significantly negative, indicating that after having a firstborn daughter, the next child is born on
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average only 16 days sooner than if the firstborn had been a son. All of these estimates suggest that although
parents have strong demand for sons, sex-selective abortion is not a concern in our data if we control for
parental education and year of birth, maternal age at the first birth and district-level fixed effects.
2.3 Demand for Multiple Sons — Son-Preferring Stopping Rules
Taiwanese have a long tradition of pro-male bias owing to cultural and economic factors. Confucianism
— the grounding philosophy in Taiwan, Japan, Korea and imperial China — dictates social statutes and
provides rationales for the subordination of women to men, within a strict family hierarchy. According to
Confucianism, family line and wealth should be transmitted from father to son, irrespective of ability, except
in cases where there is no direct male line. In return, sons and their spouses assume responsibility for taking
care of the parents if they are too infirm to work. In contrast, daughters move out of the family household at
the time of marriage. These social norms have acted as old-age social security for the elderly for centuries in
the form of extended families composed of sons (and their spouses, if married), unmarried daughters, parents
and grandparents. Although old-age social security (not based on employment) in Taiwan began in 2008,
extended families (even if they do not live together) are still the primary source of support for the elderly.
Thus, the demand for old-age social security is more likely to be met by having more sons.
Statistics suggest that a firstborn son reduces family size. As the top panel of Table 4 shows, firstborn
males have 0.26 fewer siblings than firstborn females, conditional on observed family backgrounds. This is
over 10% of the average sibsize of all families (2.47). The effect of having a firstborn son on sibsize is greater
among families in rural areas, or when the mother or father’s education level is less than high school. Because
a firstborn son significantly reduces the chances of having a second child, the families with a firstborn son
or firstborn daughter who has a certain number of siblings are not comparable because the former group
probably has preferences for larger families. Thus, our analysis separates 434,729 firstborn sons from 416,315
firstborn daughters out of the 851,044 families with two or more children.
We report the demand for multiple sons in the middle and bottom panels of Table 4, where we estimate
the effect of a change in sibling gender composition on sibsize in the families with one or more children,
conditional on observed family backgrounds. Taiwanese families strongly prefer sons to daughters, and
multiple sons to mixed-sex composition — unlike American families, who prefer mixed-sex composition, as
documented by Angrist and Evans (1998); and the tendency gets stronger if the mother or the father is less
educated or if the child was born in a rural area. Model (I) in the middle panel shows that having a son,
regardless of the birth order, decreases sibsize by 0.43. Because the result indicates that birth order is not
important in explaining the demand for sons in our data, we further use Model (II) where we focus on the
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impact of sibling gender composition on sibsize, leaving out the factor of birth order. The results suggest
that compared with families with two males, those with two females have about 0.53 more children, and
those with mixed-sex composition have about 0.10 more. These estimates are extraordinarily large, since
they account for 20% and 4%, respectively, of the average sibsize (2.67).
Several previous studies have suggested that gender bias is stronger in rural areas (e.g. Barcellos, Carvalho
and Lleras-Muney, 2014). Columns (4) and (5) of Table 4 show that the son-preferring stopping behaviors
are also more evident in rural areas of Taiwan. Family size reduction because of a firstborn son in rural
areas is more than 30% (=0.288/0.218-1) higher than the urban counterpart. Additionally, in urban areas,
parents who have a boy and a girl in the first two births have 0.07 more children than those who have two
boys (SE=0.003). This magnitude in rural areas is more than 65% (=0.116/0.070-1) higher than the urban
counterpart. While Taiwanese families in both rural and urban areas have strong demand for sons, it is
stronger for rural families than for urban families.
The remainder of Table 4 examines heterogeneity in demand for sons by parental education. Columns
(6) to (9) show that family size reduction owing to a firstborn son is more than 35% (=0.295/0.201-1;
0.296/0.219-1) stronger if the mother or father has no (vocational or academic) high school diploma. Similar
to the rural-urban comparison, the difference in the demand for multiple sons by parental education levels
is also more evident in higher parities, as the bottom panel of the table shows. It should be noted that since
parental education is higher in urban areas than in rural areas, the comparison across subpopulations does
not isolate the comparative static of interest.
3 Empirical Strategy
Following the literature on gender bias, we assume sibling gender composition is conditionally exogenous.
Using the same data, Lin, Liu and Qian (2014) have provided strong evidence supporting this assumption.
We reconfirm in Section 2.2 that evidence of sex selection is absent. Since a firstborn son considerably reduces
family size, we split the firstborn population by gender throughout our analysis. We study the causal effects
of having a next brother on firstborn education, not on the education of children born later, since having
any later-born child is a parental choice that can be affected by the gender composition of existing children.
Consider a regression model of the first child’s education (Y) on the sex of the next sibling (D or
Boy2nd) and parents’ fertility choice (M). We define M as parents’ decision to have more than two births
(M = Morethan2) since the first-stage F statistic is stronger (see Table A4). For some specifications, we
measure parents’ fertility choice by number of children (M = Sibsize). For ease of exposition, the first
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child’s gender and family background are suppressed, though always included.12
Y = β0 + β1D + β2M + β3D ×M + ǫDM , (1)
where D is the indicator for a next brother and the Greek letters are coefficients. In particular, β2 is the
family size effect given a next sister and β3 indicates the reduction in the family size effect due to a next
brother (relative to a next sister). The error term ǫDM can vary with fertility choice M and sibling gender
D in order to allow each firstborn to have idiosyncratic gains from a next brother or a smaller family.13
The interaction between sibling gender D and fertility choice M is required for unbiased estimation
because the family size effect may depend on the gender composition of existing children. A next brother
can reduce the quality-quantity tradeoff (if any) because son-preferring parents might improve the family
environment for that son. In addition, younger brother effects may depend on family size too. For example,
if parents have had a son but want a larger family anyway, then a next brother might affect the firstborn
daughter’s education relatively less because the parents have a weaker pro-son bias compared with those
who stop fertility after that son. Given these behaviors, we expect β3 > 0.
By keeping the realized fertility choice M constant, conventional methods measure the DE of sibling
gender as follows, referred to as the “controlled direct effect”: CDE(M) ≡ E[Y |M,D = 1] − E[Y |M,D =
0] = β1 + β3E[M ]. However, this method excludes families who follow the son-preferring stopping rules,
so the estimation result is doomed to understate the degree of gender bias or sibling rivalry. Because this
measure for DE has kept the observed sibsize constant, it leaves no variation in observed sibsize for data
analysts to formulate the indirect effect of sibling gender via a change in sibsize.
Rather than keeping the realized sibsize constant, we use potential sibsize in counterfactual worlds to
define DE and IE on individual firstborn children. However, the counterfactual outcome given a next
sister and the counterfactual outcome given a next brother cannot both be observed for every firstborn
child. Under the assumption of randomized child gender, we use the following two properties to proceed:
(1) conditional on sibsize, ǫ1M and ǫ0M have the same distribution; (2) conditional on randomized sibling
gender, the conditional mean of potential sibsize is equal to the conditional mean of observed sibsize. Using
these two properties, we show in an appendix that the sample analogs of DE and IE can be written in terms
12In addition to the firstborn’s gender, we include the full set of indicators for urban, the subject’s age and district of birth,
parents’ education and years of birth, and mother’s age at the first birth. We exclude child initial health (e.g. birthweight or
gestational length) from our regressions because those are bad controls, which can be affected by child gender. Additionally,
we estimate standard errors conservatively using robust standard errors. Results remain unchanged when the standard errors
are calculated by clustering at the birth district level.
13Consider a random-coefficient model, Y = β0 + (β1 + ρ1)D+ (β2 + ρ2)M + (β3 + ρ3)D×M + ǫ, where ǫ is independent of
D and M , ρ1 captures parents’ utility gain from having a younger son and (ρ2, ρ3) capture parents’ utility gains from family
size. Collecting all error terms yields ǫDM = ǫ+ ρ1D+ ρ2M + ρ3D×M , which is correlated with M but uncorrelated with the
random assignment D. This model is less restrictive than a constant-coefficient model, and it can help predict the direction of
omitted variable bias (see footnote 14).
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of the regression coefficients and the conditional means of realized sibsize:
ADE = β1 + β3E[M |D = 1], (2)
AIE = β2{E[M |D = 1]− E[M |D = 0]}. (3)
The sample analog of the total effect, ATE, is the sum of ADE and AIE. Notably, omitting the interaction
term (β3 = 0) is observationally equivalent to equating E[M ] and E[M |D = 1], i.e. assuming fertility choice
is not son-preferring. Coexistence of the son-preferring stopping rule (E[M |D = 1] < E[M |D = 0]) and the
quality-quantity tradeoff (β2 < 0) implies AIE > 0. If child quality is independent of quantity (β2 = 0),
then AIE = 0.
To construct unbiased and consistent estimates of ADE and AIE, unbiased and consistent estimates of
(β1, β2, β3) are needed. However, problems of endogeneity arise because fertility choice M can be correlated
with unobserved parental preferences, family background and child characteristics in ǫDM . To address this,
we apply 2SLS using the incidence of twins at the second birth. The second stage is the outcome equation (1).
In the first stage, we instrument M with an indicator of whether the second birth is twins (Z = Twin2nd)
and we instrument the interaction D×M with an interaction D×Z, as indicated by these two equations:14
M = α0 + α1D + α2Z + α3D × Z + u, (4)
D ×M = γ0 + γ1D + γ2Z + γ3D × Z + v. (5)
Error terms u and v can be correlated with ǫDM . Again, we suppress the gender of the firstborn and the
same set of covariates as in the outcome equation (1), for ease of exposition. Since the decomposed effects
are both linear in regression coefficients, as equations (2) and (3) indicate, we calculate their standard errors
using conventional methods (by testing for linear restrictions).15
In summary, we study how a secondborn brother affects the outcomes of the firstborn, either directly or
indirectly through changing sibsize. We instrument sibsize with whether the second birth is a twin birth.
14We illustrate how we can predict the direction of omitted variable bias using the random-coefficient model described in
footnote 13. If the next sibling is female, parents’ utility gain from a larger family would be greater, so corr(M, ǫ0M ) =
corr(M, ǫ + ρ2M) = ρ2 > 0. Thus, OLS understates the magnitude of the quality-quantity tradeoff for firstborn outcomes
given a next sister. In contrast, if the next sibling is male, then parents’ utility gain from a smaller family would be greater, so
corr(M, ǫ1M ) = ρ2 + ρ3 < 0. Thus, we expect ρ3 < 0 and OLS overstates the magnitude of the tradeoff given a next brother.
Thus, the direction of omitted variable bias for the quality-quantity tradeoff depends on the gender composition of existing
children. Additionally, omitting the interaction term would augment the error term: ǫDM = ǫ+ ρ1D+ ρ2M +(β3+ ρ3)D×M .
Now we have corr(M, ǫ0M ) = ρ2 > 0 and corr(M, ǫ1M ) = ρ2 + ρ3 + β3. The direction of the bias still depends on the gender
composition of existing children: 2SLS without the interaction still understates the magnitude of the tradeoff given a next
sister. However, given a next brother, the direction of bias depends on the relative magnitudes of β3 and ρ2 + ρ3.
15Most studies on sibling rivalry overlook the problem of endogenous family size. One important exception is Vogl (2013),
who addresses the problem by estimating two separate reduced-form regressions of firstborn sisters’ outcomes on two twin sisters
relative to a singleton sister and on two twin brothers relative to a singleton brother (that is, the combination of D and M by
multiplicity). The difference in these reduced-form estimates, divided by the first stage, will provide a Wald statistic for β3.
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Our identification strategy requires that the twins instrument and the sex composition of the first two births
are both conditionally exogenous. We present empirical evidence justifying these requirements in Sections
2.2 and 4.5. To allow fertility choice to be son-preferring, our regression model interacts sibsize with sibling
gender and it instruments this interaction by interacting the twins instrument with sibling gender in the first
stage. Omitting the interaction term would lead to biased results, as the results in Section 4 suggest.
4 Empirical Results
Using data from families with at least two children, we estimate the ADE and AIE of having a next brother
on the first child’s education, measured by high school completion and university attainment. We first
present the OLS benchmark to show the relative importance of the included covariates and the interaction
term. We implement 2SLS using twins at the second birth as instrument for fertility choice M , measured by
Morethan2 or Sibsize. The first-stage estimates suggest no concern over weak instruments. The second-stage
results show that quality-quantity tradeoffs appear only among firstborn females whose next sibling is also
female. The decomposed results suggest that the conventional measures understate the degree of gender bias,
primarily because the interaction between sibsize and sibling gender is omitted and the endogeneity problem
of fertility choice is overlooked. The magnitude of understatement is markedly large particularly for firstborn
females’ high school completion. We report empirical evidence supporting our identification assumption that
both sibling gender composition and the twins instrument are conditionally exogenous. Finally, we address
other specification concerns and discuss the results about effect heterogeneity.
4.1 OLS Results
Before presenting the 2SLS results, we report OLS coefficients in the outcome regression (1) using data
that will be used for 2SLS estimation. Table 5 presents two sets of results: one includes family composi-
tion variables (D = Boy2nd and M = Morethan2) with no controls and the other additionally includes
controls. Results in Table A3 using Sibsize as the fertility choice measure show similar patterns. In the
shortest regression with sibling gender as the only regressor, the coefficient of Boy2nd in Columns (1) and
(7) represents the unconditional mean difference in firstborn education by gender of the next sibling. In
longer regressions with controls, the coefficient of Boy2nd in Columns (4) and (10) represents the conditional
mean difference. Both conditional and unconditional mean differences are smaller than 0.3 percentage point.
In particular, the conditional mean difference is small and positive for firstborn females, while small and
negative for firstborn males. This does not imply no gender bias against females because a negative ADE
and a positive AIE of similar magnitudes might have canceled each other out.
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After addingMorethan2 into the regressions with controls, the coefficient of Boy2nd is adjusted downward
to be (more) negative. This downward adjustment is expected because the correlation between Boy2nd and
Morethan2 is strongly negative due to the son-preferring stopping rule. A next brother induces son-preferring
parents to have a smaller family and thus enables them to invest more in the first child. To allow the sibsize
effect to vary with sibling gender (or the sibling gender effects to vary with sibsize), we further add the
interaction between sibsize and sibling gender in the outcome regression. In the models including the
interaction, the coefficient of Boy2nd and the coefficient of Morethan2 significantly decrease with inclusion
of the control variables (e.g., parents’ education). This suggests that omitting parents’ education and other
family backgrounds may lead to overstatement of the two coefficients. Contrary to what we have expected
(as explained in Section 3), the OLS estimated coefficient of the interaction term is negative, seemingly
suggesting that firstborn children’s outcomes are more hurt by a larger family if the next sibling is male.
However, the endogeneity issue of fertility choice is intensified by its interaction with gender composition.
The OLS estimates with or without interactions are both biased and difficult to compare/interpret.
4.2 First-Stage Estimates
To address endogeneity of family size and its interaction with sibling gender, we instrument Morethan2 using
the occurrence of twins at the second birth (Twin2nd) and we instrument Morethan2 × Boy2nd using the
interaction Twin2nd × Boy2nd. Table A4 shows a strong first-stage. The estimates in Columns (2) and
(4) of the top panel suggest that a twin birth significantly increases the probability of having more than
two births. Additionally, firstborn females have a smaller first-stage estimate than firstborn males because
families with a firstborn daughter tend to opt for a larger family anyway, regardless of the occurrence of
twins. In particular, when the first two births are both male, the first-stage estimate is largest, at around
60 percentage points (=0.539+0.067), as Column (4) shows. In contrast, when the first two births are both
female, the first stage is smallest, at around 32 percentage points, as Column (2) indicates. These estimates
are precisely estimated, with standard errors no larger than 0.7 percentage points. In panels (3) and (4),
we also report the first-stage estimates for Sibsize and its interaction with Boy2nd. The results suggest a
twin birth increases the number of siblings by about 0.6–0.7 children (SE≤ 0.03) for various compositions of
sibling gender.
The first-stage F -statistic for Morethan2 and its interaction with Boy2nd, calculated in a manner that
takes account of multiple endogenous variables (as in Angrist and Pischke (2009, pp. 217–218)), is between
2,046 and 12,866. The same F -statistic for Sibsize and its interaction with Boy2nd is between 488 and
6,300, markedly lower but still outside the range where bias in 2SLS estimates could be a concern. Because
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the first-stage F -statistic for Morethan2 is considerably larger than that for Sibsize, we focus our discussion
on the results using Morethan2.16
4.3 Second-Stage Estimates and Quality-Quantity Tradeoffs
We report the second-stage results for two educational outcomes — high school completion and university
attainment — at the top of Tables 6 and 7 respectively. We noted in Section 3 that the coefficient of a next
brother (Boy2nd) cannot be interpreted as his direct effect on firstborn outcomes, although it helps estimate
the direct rivalry effect (see results in the next subsection). In what follows, we explain why interactions
between sibsize and sibling gender are required for unbiased estimation, discuss how family size effects change
with gender composition, and relate our findings to the literature on family size effects.
Under the son-preferring fertility-stopping rule, omission of interactions between sibsize and sibling gender
is equivalent to assuming sibsize and sibling gender affect the first child’s outcomes through two independent
channels. This assumption is unrealistic under the stopping rule because parents desired family size may
change with the gender composition of existing children. As a result, the magnitude of the quality-quantity
tradeoff can vary with sibling gender composition. For example, a next brother (relative to a next sister)
may induce son-preferring parents to improve the family environment, such as by increasing the time the
mother spends at home (Rose, 2000), increasing the father’s labor supply and wages (Lundberg and Rose,
2002) and increasing the probability of parents staying together (Ananat and Michaels, 2008; Dahl and
Moretti, 2008). These improvements initially for the younger son may benefit firstborns too. The parents’
behavioral adjustments for a younger son suggest a positive coefficient of the interaction between Boy2nd
and Morethan2, which can offset some of the quality-quantity tradeoffs (if any).
As Columns (5) and (10) in both tables show, the 2SLS estimated coefficient of the interaction is indeed
positive and cancels out a large part of the main effect of family size, given a next brother. Firstborn
daughters with a next brother receive almost no family size effect, as suggested by the sum of the family size
main effect and the coefficient of the interaction term. In contrast, given a next sister, the family size effect
is startlingly strong for firstborn females. If parents go on to have a third child, then firstborn daughters
with a next sister face a 10 percentage point reduction in high school completion and a 7 percentage point
reduction in university attainment. This accounts for nearly 40% of the average high school completion
rate and the average university enrollment rate.17 The pattern of these estimates is robust, irrespective of
using Morethan2 or Sibsize as the measure for family size — see Tables 8 and 9. Similar results appear
among firstborn sons, although all estimates regarding the effects of family size and interactions are small
16Reduced-form results can be found in Table A5.
170.0955/0.246 or 0.0669/0.177 is approximately 40%.
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and insignificant.
To investigate the magnitude of omitted variable bias in estimating the family size effects, we compare
the OLS and 2SLS results in Columns (4) and (5) or Columns (9) and (10), both including interactions.18
We find that the OLS understates the quality-quantity tradeoff given a next sister, but overstates the tradeoff
given a next brother. This pattern of biases is particularly evident among firstborn females. Specifically,
for firstborn daughters with a next sister, the OLS estimated impact of a third child in the family is only
a 1 percentage point reduction in both high school completion and university attainment. This accounts
for less than 13% of the tradeoff suggested by 2SLS estimates.19 In contrast, for firstborn daughters with
a next brother, OLS estimates suggest a third child in the family reduces firstborn daughters’ educational
attainment by 2 percentage points, significantly greater than the zero effect that the 2SLS estimate would
suggest.20 The relationship between the direction of bias and the gender composition of existing children is
consistent with what we predicted in footnote 14.
Omitted interaction bias is a special case of omitted variable bias. For the purposes of comparing
estimation results using the same set of compliers as in the full model, we interact Twin2nd and Boy2nd in
the first stage while omitting the interaction between Morethan2 and Boy2nd in the second stage. The 2SLS
results in Columns (3) and (8) suggest that omitting interactions in the second stage leads to understatement
of the quality-quantity tradeoffs given a next sister, but overstatement given a next brother.21 This is as
we predicted earlier in footnote 14 for general directions of omitted variable bias even if interactions are
included.
In summary, the second-stage results suggest that under son preference and the son-preferring fertility-
stopping rule, the family size effect strongly depends on sibling gender composition particularly among
firstborn daughters. Although not the main focus of this paper, this part of the analysis relates to the
literature on the effect of family size on child outcomes or parental behaviors, using variation due to twin
births or preferences for a specific gender composition. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) were the first to use
twins to identify family size effects and Angrist and Evans (1998) were the first to use the gender composition
of existing children to identify the family size effects on parents’ labor supply. More recently, Black, Devereux
and Salvanes (2005) and Angrist, Lavy and Schlosser (2010) find no evidence in data from Norway and Israel
that an exogenous increase in the number of younger siblings (induced by twins or variation in sibling gender
composition) affects adult outcomes. Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2010) focus on younger Norwegian
18It is difficult to explain the change in OLS estimates from Column (1) or (6) (without interactions) to Column (4) or (9)
(with interactions) because both contain omitted variables correlated with family size.
190.0109/0.0955 and 0.0088/0.0669 are no more than 13%.
20The OLS estimate here is derived by summing the coefficients of Morethan2 and its interaction with Boy2nd (−0.0109 −
0.0109 from Table 6) in Column (4). The corresponding 2SLS estimate is derived using data in Column (5) (−0.0955+0.0960).
21Example comparisons are |0.0240| < |0.0955| given a next sister and |0.0240| > |0.0955 + 0.0960| given a next brother.
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cohorts and find mixed evidence: no evidence that an exogenous increase in family size induced by gender
composition has an impact on IQ scores, but some evidence that an increase in family size induced by twins
has a negative impact. Conley and Glauber (2006) and Ca´ceres-Delpiano (2006) find negative family size
effects on attending private school in the United States. However, while the former suggest a negative impact
of family size on grade retention, the latter shows no significant impact.
Other empirical work that exploits an exogenous increase in the number of younger siblings has used data
from developing countries. Important examples are Li, Zhang and Zhu (2008) and Rosenzweig and Zhang
(2009), both using Chinese twins, and Ponczek and Souza (2012) using Brazilian twins. These three studies
from developing countries suggest a marked tradeoff between child quality and quantity. Rosenzweig and
Wolpin (2000) have noted that in countries such as India where son preference is strong, gender composition
might directly affect outcomes due to economies of scale, such as clothes sharing. More generally, gender
composition directly affects adult outcomes, including parents’ labor supply and earnings and the relationship
between them;22 thus, child outcomes are also likely affected through channels other than variation in family
size. In the following subsection, we show robust evidence of a direct impact of a next brother on high school
completion of firstborn daughters and sons in Taiwan. This suggests that in regions such as Taiwan where
the son-preferring stopping rule is prevalent, gender composition is not a valid instrument for family size
since it violates the exclusion restriction by directly affecting child education.
4.4 Main Results: Decomposed Effects of Sibling Gender
The baseline decomposed results appear at the bottom of Tables 6 and 7, which summarize the sample
analogs of the total effect, indirect effect and direct effect of a next brother on the education of firstborn
daughters and sons (denoted by ATE, AIE and ADE). As simple statistics suggest that firstborn females
are more likely than firstborn males to complete high school or enroll in university, even with markedly
strong demand for sons, the ATE of a next brother on firstborn education also seemingly suggests no gender
discrimination; for both firstborn females and firstborn males, the ATE is nearly zero although some are
statistically significant.
However, a zero or positive ATE is likely a result of the son-preferring stopping rule being prevalent. A
positive indirect effect of a younger brother — via reduced family size — might have masked the direct rivalry
effect on his older sibling. Since the magnitude of the AIE has not been revealed before, we first describe in
detail how we estimate AIE using the strategy introduced in Section 3. For example, the 2SLS full model in
Column (5) of Table 6 shows that AIE = 0.0211, which is derived by multiplying the effect of Morethan2 on
22See Rose (2000) and Lundberg and Rose (2002) using data from India and Dahl and Moretti (2008) and Ananat and
Michaels (2008) using data from the United States.
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the firstborn daughter’s high school completion given a next sister (that is, β2 = 0.0955) by the effect of a next
brother on the probability of having Morethan2 (that is, E[M |D = 1] − E[M |D = 0] = 0.4787 − 0.6991).
Similarly, ADE = 0.0192 is derived by the 2SLS estimated coefficient on Boy2nd (that is, β1 = 0.0651)
plus the interaction’s coefficient (β3 = 0.0960) being multiplied by the probability of Morethan2 when the
secondborn is male (E[M |D = 1] = 0.4787). Since both AIE and ADE estimators are linear in the regression
coefficients, we use a simple linear restriction to derive the standard errors.
Additionally, we use an alternative family size measure, Sibsize, to estimate the decomposed effects,
as Tables 8 and 9 show. Because the decomposed results are strikingly similar, irrespective of the choice
of family size measure, and because the first stage for Morethan2 is stronger than that for Sibsize, our
discussion focuses on the 2SLS results using Morethan2.
The 2SLS estimated AIE suggests that through decreasing potential sibsize of firstborn daughters, a
next brother indirectly causes a 2 percentage point increase in the probability of completing high school and
a 1.5 percentage point increase in the probability of enrolling in university. The results are almost identical
using either Morethan2 or Sibsize, as shown in Column (5) of Tables 6 and 8 for high school completion
and Tables 7 and 9 for university attainment. The magnitude of AIE is not negligible since it accounts for
9% (0.0211/0.246) of the high school completion rate and 8% (0.0148/0.177) of the university enrollment
rate, both precisely estimated. In contrast, the 2SLS estimates of the AIE on firstborn sons’ high school
completion and university attainment are only 0.2 percentage points, accounting for 1% (0.0020/0.239 or
0.0017/0.153) of the sample mean or less.
The markedly large difference in the magnitude of the AIE between firstborn daughters and sons indicates
the presence of gender bias, resulting primarily from two factors. (i) Firstborn daughters bear a much larger
family size effect than firstborn sons do, if the next sibling is female. If the next sibling is male, the quality-
quantity tradeoffs are nearly zero for firstborn sons and daughters. (ii) While a next brother decreases the
probability for firstborn sons of having Morethan2 by only 6 percentage points (E[M |D = 1] − E[M |D =
0] = 0.4191 − 0.4831), the reduction is much higher for firstborn daughters, at about 22 percentage points
(0.4787 − 0.6991). This result is not surprising because we now allow families to follow the son-preferring
stopping rule in the model by interacting sibsize with sibling gender composition.
The large positive AIE on firstborn daughters almost entirely offsets the direct rivalry effect of male
siblings, measured by ADE. The 2SLS estimated ADE in Column (5) of Tables 6 and 7 suggests that
a next brother directly reduces the probability for firstborn daughters of completing high school by 1.9
percentage points (SE=0.0076) and of enrolling in university by 1.3 percentage points (SE=0.0069). Both
ADEs account for 7–8% (0.0192/0.246 or 0.0125/0.177) of the sample mean. In contrast, the 2SLS estimated
ADE for firstborn sons, reported in Column (10), suggests that a next brother has little impact on firstborn
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sons’ high school completion or university attainment. The estimates have standard errors as small as 0.2
percentage points. We note that regardless of firstborn gender, the negative ADE is almost entirely offset
by the positive AIE, resulting in a nearly zero total effect.
In the previous literature, the direct rivalry effect of male siblings was measured by the coefficient of
Boy2nd in regression models without interactions, and sibsize was assumed to be exogenous and independent
of the gender composition of older siblings. Our OLS estimated coefficients of Boy2nd in Columns (1) and
(6) indicate a nearly zero direct rivalry effect, regardless of firstborn gender. This coefficient is equal to
CDE assuming no interaction term. Even if the interaction term is included, as in Columns (4) and (9), the
OLS estimated CDE remains small or statistically insignificant. Overall, the OLS estimates show no sign
of sibling rivalry, irrespective of whether the interaction is included.
The 2SLS estimated CDE excluding the interaction also considerably understates ADE. As Columns
(2) and (3) show, without interactions, the 2SLS estimated CDE on firstborn daughters suggests a decrease
in high school completion by 0.3–0.6 percentage points and a decrease in university enrollment by 0.2–0.4
percentage points. These only capture less than one-third of the 2SLS estimated ADE in Column (5) where
the interaction term is included. Similar patterns appear in Columns (7) and (8) for firstborn sons.
In Column (5) of both tables, we can compare the 2SLS estimated ADE and CDE among firstborn
females using the same regression model. The former is more than double the latter, and the downward
bias of CDE is statistically significant for high school completion but imprecise for university attainment.
The key difference between these two measures is that ADE is evaluated at the conditional mean of family
size as if every firstborn’s next sibling were male. In contrast, CDE is evaluated at the unconditional
mean, assuming sibsize does not adjust for the gender composition of existing siblings. The gap between
conditional and unconditional family size is larger among firstborn daughters because many parents follow
the son-preferring stopping rule. The stronger the demand for sons is, the larger the downward bias of
CDE is. A firstborn son lessens parental demand for sons, so the downward bias of CDE is smaller among
firstborn sons.
Overall, the decomposed effects of sibling gender are larger on firstborn females than on firstborn males.
As the estimates of the full 2SLS model suggest, AIE for firstborn females is nine or ten times (0.0148/0.0017
or 0.0211/0.0020) that for firstborn males, and ADE for firstborn females is at least quadruple that for
firstborn males. This reveals a strong gender bias against firstborn females’ educational attainment, which
cannot be uncovered by conventional measures, such as ATE or CDE, or from the coefficient of sibling
gender. The decomposition results are robust, regardless of which fertility choice measure (Sibsize or
Morethan2) is adopted, as long as we include an interaction term in the 2SLS model.
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4.5 Testing for Exogeneity of the Twins Instrument
Conditional exogeneity of the twins instrument has been questioned because twins have lower birthweight.
The birth of twin siblings likely has a direct effect on firstborn children beyond just increasing family size.
Weaker health conditions of secondborn twins may induce parents to divert family resources from the twins
to the firstborn singleton (if parents have efficiency concerns) or the other way around (if parents have
inequality aversion). In either case, estimation results regarding the family size effect and the decomposed
effects of sibling gender will be biased.
Although conditional exogeneity of the twins instrument is not testable, we examine whether the occur-
rence of twins can be explained by observed family backgrounds, such as parental age and education, and
district fixed effects of the firstborn’s birthplace. We begin by testing the significance of the unconditional
mean differences in family backgrounds by Twin2nd. As Columns (3) and (4) of Table A1 show, the occur-
rence of twins appears to increase with parental education, maternal age and the birthplace being urban.
Because the correlation between parental education and twinning might result from age effects, a more sen-
sible check for conditional exogeneity is to test the significance of the conditional mean differences. In Table
A2, we test whether or not Twin2nd can be explained by parental education, after controlling for the full
set of dummies for parental birth years, maternal age and district fixed effects. The large p-value rejects
the joint hypothesis that the full set of parental education dummies is important in explaining variation in
Twin2nd. Additionally, after controlling for district fixed effects of firstborn birthplace, the coefficient of the
urban dummy becomes insignificant. These statistics suggest no evidence that endogeneity of it Twin2nd
can be a major concern after controlling for observed family backgrounds.23
Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) recommend controlling for the mean birthweight of secondborn twins to
address the issue of twins’ endowment deficit. The idea is that by fixing the birthweight of the second
birth (in addition to family background), the only channel through which twinning at the second birth
can affect the firstborn child’s education is through changing the sibsize. However, this approach is not
suitable for studies aiming to detect gender bias because boys are heavier than girls at birth on average.
Part of the younger brother rivalry effect would be mistaken as a birthweight effect if we included the mean
birthweight of the secondborn. Indeed, as Columns (3) and (7) of Table 10 show for firstborn girls, inclusion
of the mean birthweight of the second birth considerably decreases the estimated decomposed effects and
family size effects by approximately one-third (0.0144/0.0211−1 using AIE for high school completion as an
example). Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2010) have noted that conditional exogeneity of Twin2nd might be
23The first ovulation induction technology was developed in the laboratory during the late 1950s, but it was not until 1993
that the World Health Organization started evaluating the effectiveness of the related technology. Most children in our data were
born prior to 1993 and the effectiveness of fertility-inducing drugs was not clear then. Thus, the chance of ovulation-inducing
technologies being commercialized or widespread would be very low during our data period.
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invalidated by inclusion of initial health conditions (such as birthweight). Birthweight is endogenous since it
can be shaped by a wide range of factors, including maternal education, the introduction of social programs,
and the interplay of genes and environments (see, e.g., Almond, Chay and Lee (2005) and Currie (2009)).
Thus, our baseline results exclude the birthweight of twins from the analysis.
4.6 Other Specification Issues
We investigate more specification issues in Table 10 using data from firstborn daughters. Estimates for
firstborn sons in Table A7 have similar patterns although much smaller in magnitude and mostly insignificant.
Similar to the problem with birthweight, gestational length is another initial health condition that is
arguably endogenous, being partly dependent on the child’s gender. In our data, boys at the second birth
have 0.048 weeks shorter gestational period (SE=0.003) and are 104 grams heavier at birth (SE=1.007),
on average, than their female counterparts. Both differences are significant at the 1% level. Firstly, to
address the problem that Boy2nd affects birthweight, we calculate the birthweight percentile of the second
birth given the child’s gender, and control for the intrafamily mean of the secondborn birthweight percentile.
Columns (2) and (6) of Table 10 show that sibling birthweight percentile is positively correlated with firstborn
education. Additionally, sibling birthweight percentile is negatively correlated with family size, as Column
(3) of Table A6 indicates. Given that sibling birthweight percentile is positively correlated with firstborn
outcomes and negatively correlated with Morethan2, it is to be expected that the family size effect and the
decomposed effects both decrease in magnitude when we include sibling birthweight percentile.24
In contrast, although gestational periods are slightly shorter for boys than for girls, gestational length
has no explanatory power for firstborn education, as Columns (3) and (7) of Table 10 show. Consequently,
inclusion of gestational periods has almost no impact on our baseline results (see Columns (1) and (5)).
Spacing between the first two births is potentially a parental choice variable (depending on firstborn
gender) because birth spacing decreases significantly with the presence of a firstborn daughter. If the first
child is a girl, son-preferring parents tend to rush to try another birth. As Table 3 shows, the main effect of
Girl1st on birth spacing is significantly negative, between -10 and -17 days (SE=2–4 days) . This suggests
that birth spacing is endogenous, depending on the gender composition of existing children. Although the
coefficient of birth spacing in Columns (4) and (8) of Table 10 is virtually zero, the tight correlation between
birth spacing and firstborn gender might make our results difficult to interpret. Thus, we prefer the baseline
results to exclude birth spacing although this might have overstated the magnitude of ADE. Nevertheless,
24The estimated coefficients (β1, β2, β3) in Columns (2) and (6) of Tables 10 and A7 almost remain unchanged if we replace
sibling birthweight percentile with sibling birthweight. This suggests that the downward adjustments in both columns result
mostly from the negative correlation between sibling birthweight and family size, not from the association between sibling
birthweight and Boy2nd.
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when birth spacing is included, our results remain almost unchanged, as shown in Columns (4) and (8) of
Table 10 for firstborn females and Table A7 for firstborn males.
This verifies the robustness of our baseline results.
4.7 Hetergeneity in Younger Brother Effects on Education
A comparison of the decomposed effects of a next brother on firstborn children from different family back-
grounds might shed light on the mechanisms behind our main result.
The top panel of Table 11 first makes a comparison by paternal education for firstborn daughters and
sons. Firstborn daughters’ high school completion and university attainment are more affected — both
directly and indirectly — by a next brother in families with a more educated father. If the father has a high
school diploma or more, the direct rivalry effect of a next brother is negative 9 percentage points, which
is entirely offset by the strong indirect effect. Both magnitudes are considerably large since they account
for around one-third of the sample mean. In contrast, if the father has no high school diploma, then the
decomposed effects on firstborn daughters’ education are much smaller and insignificant. On firstborn sons’
education, the differences by father’s education in the younger brother effects are much smaller than for their
female counterparts. Similar patterns appear in the comparisons by maternal education and by birthplace,
as shown in the second and third panels of Table 11. However, we lose precision for a clear contrast, and
the difference between urban and rural areas in the decomposed effects appears only for firstborn daughters’
university attainment, not for their high school completion.
The evidence that more educated fathers (or fathers in urban areas) have stronger gender bias against
firstborn daughters’ education is seemingly contrary to their weaker demand for sons (see Table 4). However,
these two results are consistent with Goodkind’s (1996) hypothesis, concerning the possible reduction in
postnatal discrimination following prenatal sex selection.25 In our context, although prenatal sex selection
is minimal in our data period (as discussed in Section 2), pro-male bias in fertility choice is manifested by
the prevalence of son-preferring fertility-stopping rules. Columns (1) to (4) in the top panel of Table 11
suggest that a more educated father’s strong bias against firstborn daughters’ education may represent the
substitution of his relatively weak son-preferring fertility choice for stronger discrimination in daughters’
education investment in the future. The son-preferring stopping rule that passively discriminates against
the birth of a daughter may involve reduced discrimination against daughters’ education later in life.
It is noteworthy that the substitution of the pro-male bias in fertility for the pro-male bias in parental
investment can be driven by credit constraints or cultural factors, or both. Since parental education and
25Lin, Liu and Qian (2014) have noted that increased access to sex-selective abortion in Taiwan increased the fraction of
males born and reduced the relative postnatal mortality rates of girls.
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residential areas are associated with family income and taste for education, the comparison across groups
does not distinguish one driver from the other.
5 Conclusion
Gender bias in family settings is often masked by the practice of son-preferring fertility-stopping rules,
particularly in regions where gender bias is strongest. Through stopping fertility after a son, the indirect
effect of a younger brother is positive if child outcomes would have been hurt more by a larger family size
potentially induced by a younger sister. As a typical result, the younger brother effect on child outcomes
appears too small, or the younger sister effect appears too large. Importantly, fertility choice is determined
not only by the gender composition of existing children, but also by the parents’ unobserved desire for a
large or small family, which affects family size and child outcomes simultaneously. Since parents’ preference
for family size also changes with gender composition, unbiased estimation of younger brother effects and
family size effects requires a flexible setup, such as inclusion of interactions between family size and sibling
gender composition in IV models. Using this approach, we illustrate a decomposition method to estimate
the relative importance of the direct and indirect effects in an integrated framework.
Our decomposed results show that the positive indirect effect almost entirely offsets the negative direct
rivalry effect on firstborn girls’ high school completion and university attainment, leading to a nearly zero
total effect. In contrast, neither the direct nor the indirect effect of a younger brother is important in
explaining firstborn sons’ education outcomes. The results are robust, irrespective of which measurement
choice for family size is adopted and whether or not birth spacing and/or pregnancy duration is included.
We further find that gender bias is prone to appear in urban families with more educated parents, which are
exactly the subsamples with weaker demand for sons. Pro-male biased fertility choice and pro-male biased
parental investment are likely substitutes. One important interpretation of our results is that the overall
impact of sibling gender could be much greater if parents are restricted in their ability to control their total
fertility (as in the case of the one-child policy in China). While we study a particular economy where son
preference is strong, it is in regions where son preference is the strongest that we may expect the coexistence
of a negative direct effect and a positive indirect effect, driven respectively by gender discrimination among
children and the son-preferring stopping rule.
While family size has been taken as an exogenous control in the literature on sibling rivalry and gender
bias, we address the endogeneity issues of family size particularly in the context of the son-preferring stopping
rule. Since parents’ desire for a smaller family is aroused by the presence of a younger son, the negative
correlation between that desire and family size leads to overstatement of the quality-quantity tradeoff (if
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any). By the same token, since parents’ desire for a larger family is aroused by the presence of a younger
daughter, the positive correlation between that desire and family size leads to understatement. The direction
of omitted variable bias changes with sibling gender because of the son-preferring stopping rule. We find only
firstborn females whose next sibling is also female have their educational outcomes hurt by adding another
child to the family. For the other gender compositions, the estimated effect of family size is smaller and
imprecise.
Our findings on family size effects are related to the quality-quantity tradeoff literature that uses sibling
sex composition as an instrument for family size (Angrist and Evans, 1998; Black, Devereux and Salvanes,
2005, 2010; Conley and Glauber, 2006; Ca´ceres-Delpiano, 2006; Angrist, Lavy and Schlosser, 2010). Most of
these studies use data from countries where gender bias within the family is arguably small and the demand
for sons is rare. It is likely that the direct effect of sibling gender on child outcomes is negligible (e.g.
Huber, 2015 ) and that the indirect effect via reduced family size is zero (assuming families do not follow the
son-preferring stopping rule). However, for data from countries where gender bias is known, our empirical
findings imply that the gender of the firstborn (or the gender composition of children in general) cannot be
used as an instrument for fertility since it affects child outcomes directly and violates exclusion restrictions.
As with any study, this paper has some limitations. First, our empirical strategy is only valid when the
secondborn’s gender is random. However, the randomness of the secondborn’s gender may not hold in other
regions or for younger cohorts where sex-selective abortions are practiced, as has been shown to be the case
in India and China. Second, using the twins instrument, we find the proportion of compliers (i.e., those
whose parents would respond to a change in the twins instrument) is 50–60% of the firstborn population.
Given that 88% of our sample have three or fewer children, the proportion of compliers in some developing
countries is likely lower due to stronger demand for children.
Nevertheless, the estimated magnitude of intrafamily gender bias is important for policy. Unlike the
previous evidence of gender bias mostly focusing on infant females, our results show that intrafamily gender
bias has a sizable negative impact on firstborn female adolescents’ education, although it is mostly indirectly
offset by parents’ fertility-stopping rules. As China recently started to relax the one-child policy and bring
in the two-child policy, our results predict that even though intrafamily gender bias against females is likely
to continue, some will be offset by the indirect benefits created by allowing couples to freely choose their
desired number of children (although only up to the second parity).
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Table 3: Regressions of Birth Spacing (Measured in Days) between the First Two Births
First child born in
1978–84 pre-1980 post-1980
Dependent variable next sibling
= Spacing in days born by 1985
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Girl1st×Boy2nd 3.97 4.23 3.80 -3.28
(2.81) (3.42) (4.88) (3.01)
Girl1st -15.51 -16.61 -13.17 -9.52
(2.04) (2.48) (3.55) (2.16)
Boy2nd -8.13 -7.92 -8.29 1.32
(1.98) (2.42) (3.42) (2.11)
Adjusted R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07
Sample size 850,198 598,777 251,421 241,033
Note: This table reports the OLS estimated coefficients for a regression of birth
spacing between the first two births on their sex composition. We use the same
sample as the regressions in Tables 5 to 9, except for 811 families whose second-
born children have missing or erroneous birthday information. We restrict the
sample in Column (3) to those whose first child was born from 1980 onwards and
the sample in Column (4) to those whose first child was born from 1980 onwards
with the second birth prior to 1985. Additional covariates include indicators for
urban, parental education and year of birth, mother’s age at first birth, and the
logarithm of taxable income per capita in the district of birth. Robust standard
errors are reported in (.).
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Table 11: Heterogeneous Decomposed Effects on First Child’s Education
Firstborn females Firstborn males
HS Univ HS Univ HS Univ HS Univ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Father HS+ Father HS- Father HS+ Father HS-
Sample mean 0.377 0.277 0.152 0.105 0.369 0.240 0.146 0.091
Average Total Effect/Mean 0.010 0.012 0.005 0.017 -0.008 0.007 -0.019 -0.003
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012)
(a) Average Indirect Effect/Mean 0.098 0.100 0.013 -0.007 0.005 0.009 0.010 0.006
(0.028) (0.036) (0.072) (0.090) (0.004) (0.006) (0.014) (0.018)
(b) Average Direct Effect/Mean -0.088 -0.088 -0.009 0.024 -0.013 -0.002 -0.029 -0.009
(0.029) (0.036) (0.073) (0.091) (0.007) (0.010) (0.017) (0.022)
Mother HS+ Mother HS- Mother HS+ Mother HS-
Sample mean 0.415 0.307 0.164 0.114 0.401 0.265 0.160 0.099
Average Total Effect/Mean 0.003 0.002 0.013 0.027 0.008 0.002 -0.016 0.007
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011)
(a) Average Indirect Effect/Mean 0.082 0.072 0.043 0.064 0.001 0.000 0.026 0.033
(0.026) (0.033) (0.066) (0.082) (0.003) (0.005) (0.012) (0.016)
(b) Average Direct Effect/Mean -0.079 -0.070 -0.030 -0.037 0.007 0.001 -0.043 -0.026
(0.027) (0.034) (0.066) (0.083) (0.007) (0.010) (0.015) (0.019)
Urban Rural Urban Rural
Sample mean 0.298 0.216 0.219 0.157 0.281 0.181 0.217 0.139
Average Total Effect/Mean 0.009 0.014 0.007 0.012 -0.014 -0.006 -0.010 0.010
(0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009)
(a) Average Indirect Effect/Mean 0.076 0.106 0.095 0.051 0.002 0.003 0.016 0.020
(0.034) (0.043) (0.050) (0.063) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013)
(b) Average Direct Effect/Mean -0.067 -0.092 -0.088 -0.039 -0.016 -0.009 -0.026 -0.010
(0.035) (0.044) (0.051) (0.064) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015)
Note: This table reports the IV estimated decomposed effects of having a second born brother on the first child’s high school com-
pletion (HS) and university admission (Univ), by place of birth (urban versus rural) and by maternal/paternal education ((academic
or vocational) high school diploma or more (HS+) versus less high school (HS-)). M = Morethan2; results using Sibsize are almost
identical. Robust standard errors are in (.). We control for the full set of indicators for urban, the subject’s age and district of birth,
parents’ education and years of birth, and maternal age at the first birth. The decomposed effects are evaluated at the conditional
means of M=Morethan2; that is, E[M |D = 1], E[M |D = 0] in the corresponding subgroup.
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Appendix: Sample Analogs of Average Direct and Indirect Effects
This appendix shows how we derive equations (2) and (3). Let M1 and M0 denote the potential sibsize
as if the next sibling were male or female respectively, regardless of the realized gender. Motivated by
VanderWeele’s (2013, 2014) causal inference methods, we decompose the total effect (TE) of sibling gender
into DE and IE as follows. We suppress the notation for firstborn gender (and other covariates) for ease of
exposition.
DE(M1) = E[Y |M1, D = 1]− E[Y |M1, D = 0],
IE(M1,M0) = E[Y |M1, D = 0]− E[Y |M0, D = 0],
TE(M1,M0) = E[Y |M1, D = 1]− E[Y |M0, D = 0].
(6)
We measure DE by fixing potential sibsize M1 as if the gender of the next sibling were always male, and
IE through changing potential sibsize by switching the gender of the next sibling. The sum of DE and IE
is the total influence of a change in sibling gender on the firstborn. Given the son-preferring stopping rules,
potential sibsize increases with a female second birth; that is, M0 > M1 and M > M1. Therefore, DE is not
necessarily equal to CDE = E[Y |M,D = 1]− E[Y |M,D = 0].
Under the assumption of randomized sibling gender, we find two useful properties to proceed:
Property (1): ǫ1M and ǫ0M share the same distribution, conditional on sibsize M .
This implies E[ǫ1M − ǫ0M |M = m] = 0 for any sibsize m.
Property (2): Observed and potential sibsizes share the same distribution conditional on sibling gender.
This implies E[MD] = E[M |D = d] for d = 0 or 1.
Using these two properties, we can construct the sample analogs of DE and IE by averaging over all possible
values of potential sibsize in M. We start with ADE, standing for the sample analogs of DE:
ADE = Σm∈M{E[Y |M1, D = 1]− E[Y |M1, D = 0]}Pr{M1 = m|D = 1}
= Σm∈ME[(β0 + β1 + β2M1 + β3M1 + ǫ1M )− (β0 + β2M1 + ǫ0M )]Pr{M1 = m|D = 1}
= β1 + β3E[M |D = 1] + Σm∈ME[ǫ1M − ǫ0M |M = m]Pr{M = m|D = 1}
= β1 + β3E[M |D = 1].
The second equality is achieved by applying equation (1). The third and fourth equalities are achieved by
using Property (2) and Property (1) respectively. The sample analog of IE (denoted by AIE) can be derived
similarly.
Table A1: Differences in Unconditional Means for Demographics, by Boy2nd and Twin2nd
Difference in Means
By Boy2nd By Twin2nd
Firstborn Firstborn Firstborn Firstborn
female male female male
Demographic variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Urban (firstborn’s birthplace) 0.0014 -0.0002 0.0140 0.0285*
Mother has univ./professional degree+ 0.0020* -0.0002 0.0175* 0.0116*
Father has univ./professional degree+ 0.0023* 0.0013 0.0164* 0.0220*
Mother’s age at first birth 0.034* 0.001 0.339* 0.447*
Mother’s year of birth -0.041* 0.007 -0.146* -0.317*
Father’s year of birth -0.015 0.010 -0.044 -0.087
Note: This table reports the difference in means for demographic variables by Boy2nd or Twin2nd, conditional on firstborn
gender. The samples include 416,315 firstborn females and 434,729 firstborn males, who were born between 1978 and 1984 and
have at least one sibling. * indicates the 5% significance level.
Table A2: Difference in Conditional Means for Demographics, by Boy2nd and Twin2nd (OLS Results)
Dependent variable = Boy2nd Dependent variable = Twin2nd
Firstborn Firstborn Firstborn Firstborn
female male female male
Demographic variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Urban (firstborn’s birthplace) 0.014 -0.029 -0.010 -0.006
Parental education, dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
[p-value] [0.20] [0.20] [0.15] [0.14]
Mother’s age at first birth -0.0001 0.0001 0.0005* 0.0004*
Mother’s year of birth -0.0008 0.0003 0.0003* 0.0001
Father’s year of birth 0.0003 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table reports the OLS estimated coefficient, by firstborn gender, in regressions of Boy2nd or Twin2nd on covariates,
including the district fixed effects for firstborn birthplace. The samples include 416,315 firstborn females and 434,729 first-
born males, who were born between 1978 and 1984 and have at least one sibling. Parental education dummies include the 10
indicators for both mother’s and father’s highest qualifications: university degree+, professional degree, high school diploma,
vocational high school, and junior high school, using primary education or below as the reference group. P-values for the joint
test for the significance of the parental education dummies are reported in [.]. * indicates the 5% significance level.
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Table A4: First-Stage Estimates
Firstborn females Firstborn males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1) Dependent Variable = Morethan2 0.59 0.59 0.45 0.45
Boy2nd -0.219 -0.221 -0.063 -0.064
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Twin2nd 0.436 0.322 0.572 0.539
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Twin2nd×Boy2nd 0.223 0.067
(0.007) (0.007)
F -statistic for twins effect 11,973 8,680 27,123 14,081
Multivariate first-stage F -statistic 2,046 5,892
2) Dependent Variable = Morethan2×Boy2nd
Boy2nd 0.480 0.476 0.419 0.416
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Twin2nd 0.278 0.011 0.305 0.010
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002)
Twin2nd×Boy2nd 0.526 0.586
(0.004) (0.003)
F -statistic for twins effect 2,875 19,251 2,797 27,981
Multivariate first-stage F -statistic 5,110 12,866
3) Dependent Variable = Sibsize 2.80 2.80 2.55 2.55
Boy2nd -0.428 -0.428 -0.101 -0.101
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Twin2nd 0.622 0.616 0.720 0.711
(0.012) (0.019) (0.010) (0.014)
Twin2nd×Boy2nd 0.012 0.018
(0.024) (0.020)
F -statistic for twins effect 2,817 1,568 5,285 2,649
Multivariate first-stage F -statistic 488 1,191
4) Dependent Variable = Sibsize×Boy2nd
Boy2nd 2.596 2.592 2.498 2.493
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Twin2nd 0.317 0.015 0.367 0.013
(0.009) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003)
Twin2nd×Boy2nd 0.593 0.701
(0.013) (0.014)
F -statistic for twins effect 1,372 1,203 1,489 1,474
Multivariate first-stage F -statistic 3,472 6,300
Note: Panels (1) and (3) of this table report the first-stage estimates for fertility choice, using twin-
ning at the second birth (Twin2nd) as instrument. Panels (2) and (4) report the first-stage estimates
for the interaction between fertility choice and Boy2nd, using Twin2nd×Boy2nd as instrument. An in-
teraction term for Twin2nd×Boy2nd is included in Columns (2) and (4) when the interaction between
fertility choice and Boy2nd is included in the outcome equation. We include 416,315 firstborn females
and 434,729 firstborn males born between 1978 and 1984 who have at least one sibling. Additional
covariates include the full set of indicators for urban, the subject’s age and district of birth, parents’ ed-
ucation and years of birth, and mother’s age at the first birth. The multivariate first-stage F -statistics
are constructed as described in Angrist and Pischke (2009, pp. 217–18). Means of the fertility choice
variable are in italics, and robust standard errors are in (.).
Table A5: Reduced-Form Results
Firstborn females Firstborn males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Y = High school completion 0.246 0.239
Boy2nd 0.0018 0.0016 -0.0028 -0.0028
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Twin2nd -0.0149 -0.0297 -0.0117 -0.0163
(0.0075) (0.0107) (0.0076) (0.0107)
Twin2nd×Boy2nd 0.0292 0.0093
(0.0150) (0.0152)
Y = University admission 0.177 0.153
Boy2nd 0.0023 0.0021 0.0006 0.0005
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Twin2nd -0.0115 -0.0209 -0.0068 -0.0138
(0.0068) (0.0096) (0.0066) (0.0092)
Twin2nd×Boy2nd 0.0185 0.0138
(0.0135) (0.0132)
Note: This table reports the reduced-form results by firstborn gender. We regress the
educational outcomes on Boy2nd, Twin2nd, and their interaction, in addition to the full
set of indicators for urban, the subject’s age and district of birth, parents’ education and
years of birth, and maternal age at the first birth. The samples include 416,315 firstborn
females and 434,729 firstborn males, who were born between 1978 and 1984 and have at
least one sibling. Robust standard errors are reported in (.) and sample means in italics.
Table A6: Family Size and Initial Health Conditions of the Secondborn
Family Mean Mean Mean Number
size gestational birthweight birthweight of families
length percentile
2 39.571 3.301 0.515 406,255
3 39.669 3.267 0.501 328,111
4 39.675 3.233 0.490 84,418
5 39.672 3.210 0.482 15,812
6 39.669 3.203 0.478 3,198
7 39.697 3.183 0.462 674
8 39.667 3.196 0.473 168
9 or more 39.820 3.187 0.461 60
All sample 39.623 3.279 0.506 838,696
Note: This table reports relationship between family size and the initial
health conditions of the secondborn whose oldest sibling was born between
1978 and 1984. Birthweight is in kilograms and birthweight percentiles are
calculated given the child’s gender. We calculate the mean if the second-
born is twins. This data has fewer observations than the firstborn popula-
tion in Table 1 since some secondborn children have no information about
initial health conditions.
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Table A8: Earlier Models of Sibling Rivalry, Using Taiwanese Birth Data Including All Parities
Females Males
Parish Garg Butcher Parish Garg Butcher
& Willis & Morduch & Case & Willis & Morduch & Case
(1993, t3) (1998, t2) (1994, t5) (1993, t3) (1998, t2) (1994, t5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Y = High school completion 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.178 0.178 0.178
Number of younger brothers -0.0039 -0.0122
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Number of younger sisters -0.0064 -0.0075
(0.0005) (0.0006)
Number of older brothers -0.0053 -0.0083
(0.0112) (0.0101)
Number of older sisters -0.0052 -0.0081
(0.0112) (0.0101)
Any brother 0.0189 0.0095 0.0078 -0.0001
(0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0007)
Family size -0.0137 -0.0071 -0.0156 -0.0102
(0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0005)
Number of sisters 0.0078 0.0068
(0.0008) (0.0008)
Y = University admission 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.116 0.116 0.116
Number of younger brothers -0.0029 -0.0073
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Number of younger sisters -0.0045 -0.0054
(0.0004) (0.0005)
Number of older brothers -0.0084 -0.0058
(0.0098) (0.0086)
Number of older sisters -0.0075 -0.0068
(0.0098) (0.0086)
Any brother 0.0135 0.0062 0.0063 0.0017
(0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0006)
Family size -0.0102 -0.0050 -0.0102 -0.0071
(0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0004)
Number of sisters 0.0061 0.0039
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Sample size 1,148,793 1,148,793 1,148,793 1,242,095 1,242,095 1,242,095
Note: Sample mean of the corresponding educational outcome is reported in italics, and robust standard errors in (.). This table
reports the OLS results in Parish and Willis (1993 table 3), Garg and Morduch (1998 table 2), and Butcher and Case (1994 table
5), using birth registry data of all Taiwanese families whose first child is singleton and born between 1978 and 1984. We control
for the full set of dummies for urban, the subject’s age and district of birth, parents’ education and years of birth, and maternal
age at the first birth. For the regressions that include only firstborn children are reported in Table A9.
Table A9: Earlier Models of Sibling Rivalry, Using Taiwanese Firstborns
Firstborn females Firstborn males
Parish Garg Butcher Parish Garg Butcher
& Willis & Morduch & Case & Willis & Morduch & Case
(1993, t3) (1998, t2) (1994, t5) (1993, t3) (1998, t2) (1994, t5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Y = High school completion 0.249 0.249 0.249 0.241 0.241 0.241
Number of (younger) brothers 0.0003 -0.0063
(0.0009) (0.0008)
Number of (younger) sisters -0.0034 0.0151 -0.0024 0.0211
(0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0015)
Any brother 0.0339 0.0169 0.0271 0.0042
(0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0013)
Family size -0.0182 -0.0052 -0.0225 -0.0053
(0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0007)
Y = University admission 0.179 0.179 0.179 0.154 0.154 0.154
Number of (younger) brothers 0.0000 -0.0031
(0.0008) (0.0007)
Number of (younger) sisters -0.0028 0.0123 -0.0020 0.0136
(0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0013)
Any brother 0.0272 0.0134 0.0198 0.005
(0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0011)
Family size -0.0148 -0.0043 -0.0149 -0.0038
(0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0006)
Sample size 466,012 466,012 466,012 499,318 499,318 499,318
Note: Sample mean of the corresponding educational outcome is reported in italics, and robust standard errors in (.). This table
reports the OLS results in Parish and Willis (1993 table 3), Garg and Morduch (1998 table 2), and Butcher and Case (1994 table
5), using population data of Taiwanese firstborn singletons born between 1978 and 1984. We control for the full set of dummies
for urban, the subject’s age and district of birth, parents’ education and years of birth, and maternal age at the first birth. For
regressions that include children at all parities are reported in Table A8.
